Introduction
FREDERIC WAKEMAN, JR.
In May 1992, with the help of the Ford, Luce, and MacArthur Foundations, a conference on the various historical perspectives of China's modernization was held at Fudan University in Shanghai.l The convenors of the symposium were Professor Wang Xi, then deputy director of the American Studies Center at Fudan, and I, then director of the Institute of East Asian Studies at the University of California, Berkeley.
The choice of the word "modernization" proved difficult for both sides of the symposium membership. Because of ongoing struggles within the Chinese government between "conservative" Party officials who resisted privatization and marketization, the term "modernization" was not used in the Chinese-language version of the conference's designation. 2 Our Chinese colleagues' ideological uneasiness was matched on the Western scholars' part by a feeling that the very invocation of "modernization" was already parti pris, recalling the assumptions of the 1950s and 1960s about the need for helping the "underdeveloped world" to "take off" and catch up with the advanced industrial countries of the West.
Yet, doubts about modernization theory notwithstanding, we all recognized the immediate relevance of the topic to the policies that Deng Xiaoping's government was then pursuing. And, precisely because China's political economy was in such a state of J We also wish to express our gratitude to Joan Kask, who attended the conference as assistant director of the institute; to Elinor Levine, who worked as a special research assistant on the project; and to Joanne Sandstrom, who as chief editor at the Institute of East Asian Studies saw this book through to completion. 2 It was, however, featured in the title of the Chinese symposium volume published three years ago. flux, we also realized that by uncovering the historical underpinnings of modernization, we would as well expose our own perspectives on the nature of long-term social change in China from the late imperial period down to the present.
Population Growth
The most secular of long-term changes discussed in this collection of path-breaking essays is population growth. As James Lee notes, between 1700 and the present, China's population "exploded" sevenfold from 175 million to 1.2 billion: a rapid rise during 1700-1800, a slight deceleration from 1800 to 1950, and then another sharp acceleration from 1950 to today. 3 This macrosocial growth has, of course, been noted by other demographers and historians. In addition to Ping-ti Ho's classic study, 4 the work of Dwight Perkins has calculated a sixfold increase in population between the fourteenth and nineteenth centuries, thanks to increasingly intensive cultivation and the expansion of arable land rather than long-term increases in per capita output. 5 Lee's contribution to the study of China's population development, on the other hand, has been based upon the unusually detailed life histories contained in imperial genealogical records and in the household registers of populations like the beekeepers of Liaoning who served the Imperial Household. These records, discovered and used by Professor Lee and his collaborators during the 1980s, have made it possible to conduct microsocial analyses of demographic behavior that underscore the uniqueness of the Chinese population's productive behavior. 6 In contrast to Western European population characteristics (high proportion of bachelorhood, late marriage, high marital fertility, "natural" morality dictated by exogenous epidemiological patterns), the Chinese practiced early and universal marriage for females, polygamous Chinese society during the modern era was stagnant, lacking any internal impetus by which to overcome the limitations of traditional society. Only after the West came knocking on its doors in the mid-nineteenth century did it undergo drastic change and begin to evolve into a modern society. Put forth by John King Fairbank, this approach, which emphasizes the influence of external factors on Chinese society, is known as the "impact-response approach. " 1 During the 1970s, this approach met with a serious challenge. The first to attack this mainstream thinking was a young scholar named James Peck. In October 1969 he published a work entitled "The Roots of Rhetoric: The Professional Ideology of America's China Watchers." 2 This work, which was a direct attack on Fairbank, characterized the impact-response approach as an apology for imperialist aggression. Fairbank responded to Peck's charge in the famous "Exchange between Fairbank and Peck." Although Peck's criticism was directed mainly at Fairbank, it implicated t In this paper, external approach, external cause, and external factors are synonyms. Internal approach, internal cause, and internal factors are also synonyms. For a typical expression of the "impact-response approach" see S. Y. Population changes are closely related to economic development; each influences and is affected by the other. Especially when a traditional society develops into a modern society, population changes reflect a very important aspect of the modernization of the society. Therefore it is important to observe the evolution of modern Chinese society from the perspective of population changes. This kind of research is difficult, however, because available statistical data are both insufficient and open to dispute. This essay does not aim to give a statistical evaluation of the problem, but to observe the course of the development of modern Chinese society from the viewpoint of several characteristics of population changes in modern China and to initiate some discussion of this problem.
Slow Increase of the Population
From 1840 to 1949, China was involved in consecutive wars, natural disasters, political reforms, and social upheavals. All these left a clear mark on China's population. The population increased rapidly up to about the middle of the eighteenth century. After 1852, population growth not only decreased quickly but actually declined. Then, beginning in the 1870s, there was a slow increase, which was sustained until 1949. The drastic fluctuation in population reflected the tragic life of the Chinese people and the hesitant progress of the modernization of Chinese society. Figure 1 outlines the contours of this sustained process of population growth. We can distinguish three rough stages: a rapid rise from 1700 to 1800, a slight deceleration from 1800 to 1950, then a sharp acceleration from 1950 to today (Ho 1959; Schran 1978) . Moreover, despite recent state efforts to restrict nuptiality and fertility, the number of Chinese will continue to increase, although at a slower rate, until the middle of the next century. By then the population will be at least 1.5 billion. In consequence, contemporary China faces unusually severe economic, ecological, and social constraints.
Western historians have long been fascinated by the social and economic implications of China's population explosion. Indeed, nearly all Western attempts to understand the macroeconomic processes of the recent Chinese past are conditioned by the rise in population beginning in the late imperial period. The consensus is that population processes played a decisive role in both expanding and restraining Chinese economic development (Elvin 1973; Myers 1980; Perkins 1969) . On the one hand, rising population density initially led to intensified production, heightened commercialization, and greater urbanization (Skinner 1964 (Skinner , 1965a (Skinner , 1965b In this essay I have borrowed freely from the fruits of my collaboration with Cameron Campbell, Ju Deyuan, William Lavely, Wang Feng, and R. Bin Wong. I thank them for their continuing efforts, in particular those of Campbell and Wang. I would also like to thank Tim Dyson, Bill Lavely, Liu Ts'ui-jing, and R. Bin Wong for their critical readings of an early draft of this paper as well as other assistance.
FIVE
Modernization and the Structure of the Chinese Economy in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries
MADELEINE ZELIN
It has now been more than a decade since China embarked on a program of economic reform based on the gradual reintroduction of family farming, private enterprise, and increasing dependence on the market as the mediator of supply and demand. In observing the economic practices and institutions that have emerged as part of this evolving process, Western scholars have frequently noted the reemergence of patterns of economic interaction and organization reminiscent of prerevolutionary days. This essay examines some of the key institutions and structural characteristics of the late traditional and early modern Chinese economy in an effort to provide a base for evaluating the long-term trends affecting the evolution of the Chinese economy to the present day. Because of the limits set on the length of these essays, I can do this only in general terms. It should be noted at the start that my approach to the modernization process in China falls somewhere in between those scholars who even today see China's population and overall backwardness as having posed an insurmountable obstacle to development and those who would argue that China in the early twentieth century was already undergoing sustained national growth in productivity and real per capita income. The century from the Opium War in 1840 to the foundation of the People's Republic of China in 1949 was a period of great transformation from traditional society to modern society. The foundation of the PRC, however, was not the end of this transformation, but rather the conclusion of its first chapter.
The era of the great transformation is also termed the era of great transition. As early as the turn of the century, Liang Qichao pointed out in an essay entitled "On the Transitional Era" that "present-day China is undergoing a great transition." He went on to describe the great difficulty in China's transitional period:
For thousands of years, China maintained itself in a fixed position without moving one inch forward, therefore had no taste whatsoever of what transition was like. Yet, lashed by the turbulent waves of the great oceans and spurred by the violent storms of the nineteenth century, this bastion of inveterate antiquity, this stronghold of obdurate tradition, has been experiencing gradual decay and collapse, and as a result the whole nation has had to trek along a rugged path of transition.!
The core of this transition was the shift from the agricultural era of a traditional way of life to an era characterized by modern modes of production. This was the most important transformation in Chinese history.
SEVEN
Western Learning and Social Transmutation in the Late Qing CHEN JIANG China's pursuit of modernization began only under the repeated lashing of the West in the late Qing period. The germination of modernity in the old society of China was, nevertheless, evident well before the outbreak of the Opium War. Embodied in the handicraft industry were seeds of the capitalist relations of production. In addition, suspicion of and protest against the monarchic tradition and dictatorship were manifested in the critical reasoning and rebellious spirit of the progressive intellectuals who urged political reform and ideological emancipation. The docking of the Cornwallis, a British warship, at Xiaguan, Nanjing, in August 1842, however, set back the social evolution of China when the British wrung a treaty from the Qing government. Unable to develop itself according to its own desired path, China began to undergo "the most difficult, most painful" transmutation like "the chrysalis of a silkworm or the exuviation of a snake." 1 The Western learning, which began its diffusion in China under the escort of opium, industrial products, strong ships, and powerful cannons in colonial expansion into the East, was resisted by some, embraced by others. The dissemination of Western learning thus played an integral part in the social transmutation of modern China and, at the same time, exerted a complicated but significant influence on the modernization of the country. These efforts and their effects were particularly noticeable in the late Qing period. It is, therefore, worthwhile to further research the history of the dissemination of Western learning and its relations to the change of Chinese society in the history of modern China. In the 1840s and the 1850s, Western countries through force of arms compelled China and Japan to open their ports for trade. Because of differences in economic, political, and cultural conditions in the two countries, the authorities adopted different ways to cope with the crisis. 1 China was then characterized by centralized authority and imperial despotism. The Qing emperor at first failed to respond. Only as foreign insults deepened did he begin to support the "self-strengthening" advocated in the authorities' calls for gradual reform. The conservative policy had little effect, however, and political deterioration continued. Japan, meanwhile, was governed by the bakuhan system, with a bakufu (nominally assistant to the emperor but actually the most influential figure in the country) and his more or less independent hans (domains) sharing among them much of the political power. Many of the low-ranking samurai, influenced by Dutch and Western learning, joined together under the impact of the Western invasion. Taking advantages of animosities between the imperial court and bakufu, and between bakufu and the strong domains of their country, they actively engaged in antishogunate activities in their base areas, or those strong domains, finally overthrowing bakufu through civil war. A united new regime representing the interests of the rising bourgeoisie was established, and comprehensive and effective Political Parties, Party Conflicts, and Society in Early Republican China YANG LIQIANG After the overthrow of the Qing dynasty, the first republican government in Chinese history was established. As sanctions against political parties vanished, a large number of political organizations quickly emerged, and party conflicts became a daily occurrence as the main bourgeois parties and associations involved in the conflicts quarreled with one another. Such dissension benefited only the autocratic and imperialist warlords, bureaucrats, and politicians headed by Yuan Shikai and Li Yuanhong, who used the opportunity to seize power. The collapse of the Qing did not produce the independent and prosperous China the Chinese bourgeoisie envisaged.
I
The Revolution of 1911 formally put an end to the Chinese monarchy. On January 1, 1912, a provisional revolutionary government was formed in Nanjing. It was welcomed with enthusiasm by many, for they believed that their ideal of a strong and prosperous China was going to be realized. In the height of this enthusiasm, various political parties and associations were formed. Most were led by the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie. They published their own manifestos and proposed their own political, economic, educational, cultural, and even behavioral programs for the future. As Ding Shanzai (Ding Shiyi) wrote, "Organizations were formed in a crazy fashion, and political parties sprang up like spring grass." 1 A conference concerned with the study of China's modernization must deal with the history of China's modern foreign relations. "Modernization," however variously defined and attempted by Chinese governments, has had as a central goal the improvement of China's relative position among nations. To that end, for governing elites of successive Chinese regimes from the late Qing until the present, "modernization" (or "self-strengthening" or "nation building") has involved two related but potentially conflicting goals: the containment of foreign power and influence and the attainment of foreign expertise. The first objective, handled by the state, was to assert and defend Chinese sovereignty in diplomacy and war, in an international environment that appeared to threaten China's national existence. The second goal necessarily involved sets of intercultural connections that included but went beyond the realm of formal state-to-state ties. This essay focuses primarily on the second area. To that end, it first examines connections between foreign policy and foreign relations; second, it discusses the internal aspects of China's foreign relations and assesses the period when the "private" realm of Sino-foreign economic and cultural relations was at its height in the first quarter of this century; and third, it examines subsequent Chinese efforts to reassert state control over the entire complex of intercultural exchange, private and public. In that context it focuses on the Nationalist period and uses Sino-American relations as a case study.
ELEVEN
The Emergence and Development of China's Modern Capitalist Enterprises ZHANG GUOHUI Chinese feudal society had reached such a stage after two thousand years of development that by the Ming dynasty the improvement of social productive forces and an influx of silver from abroad allowed a distinctive commodity and money economy to flourish. This development lasted until the eve of the Opium War. The formation of a huge commodity market based on divisions of labor resulted in the gradual emergence of a feudal market for productive forces. This development helped furnish objective conditions for the formation of an antagonistic relationship between capital and labor. Thus even without the invasion of foreign countries, China would have developed into a capitalist country. The First Opium War disrupted China's independence, however, distorting the normal course of Chinese history and, during the formation of the semicolonial social order, enabling the emergence of modern capitalist enterprises. The process of this development bears its own characteristics.
I
To make feudal China a market for foreign commodities and a supplier of raw materials, foreign capitalists brought into China new techniques and tools of production, along with corresponding capitalist management and commodities.
These new techniques and tools of production introduced a new type of productive force, which could not be accommodated by the feudal relations of production. The history of the development of Europe's modern economy shows that Britain outran (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966) . Moore suggests that there are several revolutionary paths to "modernization" (which he defines as the commercialization of agriculture): bourgeois, aristocratic, and peasant. Each is launched by a different social class; each has distinctive political and economic outcomes. Other works that acknowledge the role of revolution in political "modernization" (defined as state building) include Charles Tilly, Louise Tilly, and Richard Tilly, The Rebellious Century, 1830 -1930 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975 , and Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979) . Although none of these authors is an orthodox Marxist, all show Marxist influence in their approach. 2 Here the classic statement is Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968 China's current modernization efforts invite us to look back at similar experiences, launched in the late nineteenth century or the early twentieth century, most of which failed or half-failed.
Among the many observations that can be drawn from such comparisons, the resilience of tradition appears as a very important one. Of course such a rich and diversified tradition as the Chinese one offers both incentives and obstacles to modernization policies. In this essay I shall be concerned with the problem of power structure: of state institutions and social organizations and their mutual interactions. What is assumed is that the Four Modernizations policy owes some of its difficulties and limitations to patterns inherited from the pre-1949 period.
As is well known, late imperial administration and officials lacked specialization: they were "virtuous generalists." At the local levels, officials had acquired such control over resources that they were able to bargain with their superiors rather than simply accept their orders. Networks of officials bound by mutual obligations and patron-client ties had developed. The imperial bureaucracy was becoming less and less responsive to central policy. The declining ability of the Qing court to respond to late-nineteenth- Insufficient research has been done on the subject of modern Shanghai's influence upon the economy of the Yangzi Valley. This essay shows that if, by the nineteenth century, cities in China had not formed "unified complete urban systems, and [that] there were only several regional systems with merely some fragile links between neighboring systems," 1 then at the very least, the situation underwent great changes in the 1920s and 1930s. This was especially true of the regions along the Yangzi River, which has been called the "Golden Waterway." With the emergence of a number of big cities such as Shanghai and the gradual modernization of these cities, their importance to the middle and lower reaches of the Yangzi was greatly heightened as the economic links between cities along the river strengthened with each passing day, the interaction between them became more and more apparent.
The Modernization of Shanghai's Urban Economy
By the middle and late Qing dynasty, Shanghai, being the hub of water transportation, had gradually become the center of tax grain transshipment in southeast China and it earned the sobriquet "the gateway to the sea and the river, the metropolis of In recent years Western historiography of China, following, in part, a revival of interest in civil society in the West, has witnessed a vigorous discussion on the question of whether or not China had a "civil society" and, by implication, what kind of role this civil society could play in modernizing China. I wish to intervene at two points in this ongoing debate: At an empirical level I will try to contribute materials on state-society relations from the rural areas of the north China region in the hope of expanding the discussion which has had, in accordance with the Western model, a principally urban focus. At a theoretical level, I seek to counter the extreme objectivism in which the discussion has been embedded and to suggest that the very direction in which Chinese society would move in the early twentieth century was shaped as much by the presence of "objective" forces and conditions as by the way in which Chinese history was conceptualized, or more precisely, narrativized at that time.
Civil Society and Western Historiography of China
The reappearance of interest in European civil society has spawned a good deal of terminological confusion, and I will try to clarify my own usage of the term from the outset. Civil society represents a domain of private and collective activity autonomous from the state. It includes economic activities as well as associational life and the institutions of sociability, but excludes political parties and institutionalized politics in general. The "public sphere," in particular the bourgeois public sphere of the eighteenth century conceptualized by Jiirgen Habermas, is a Theoretically, China's modern historical experience may be compared to that of any other country or region in the world. However, it makes no sense, I would argue, to compare China's long and elusive quest for modernization to the similar experience of any land other than those with which it has shared a cultural heritage. Nineteenth-century China may have had stray economic, social, or even political characteristics in common with a host of countries around the world; its leaders' vision of what modernity would ultimately mean for China might even have shared traits with distant lands and cultures. However, the construction of any plan for modernization-economic, military, social, whateverwas, first and foremost, a cultural construct fashioned out of a set of assumptions about the world and China's capacity for change within it. Even as Chinese leaders sought the things (wu) possessed by the West (yang), the conceptualization of this approach and what it meant for China were culture specific-that is, it was created by Chinese and would have to fit "China" -just as was the understanding (or misunderstanding) of what the forces unleashed by such a program might mean in the social or political realm. Thus, to compare China with India or Great Britain or the United States or Tanzania approaches meaninglessness. It would be not unlike comparing apples and oranges, qualitatively different though both fruit.
For this general reason, and others to follow, the countries with which China is best compared for purposes of understanding its modern evolution are Japan, Korea, and Vietnam. For hundreds of years, these countries looked up to China as the fount not of a
